Issue summary: When OpenSSL processes QUIC traffic from a peer that repeatedly
sends ack-eliciting packets while not acknowledging ACK-only responses, the
QUIC stack can retain ACK-only packet metadata for the lifetime of the
connection.
Impact summary: A remote peer that can complete a QUIC handshake can
cause connection-scoped memory growth which may lead to Denial of Service
through memory exhaustion, especially with sustained traffic or many concurrent
QUIC connections.
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Description: When the OpenSSL QUIC stack sends an ACK-only packet,
there is no requirement by the QUIC protocol that the peer will acknowledge
that ACK-only packet (i.e. it is itself not ack-eliciting). However, the OpenSSL
implementation stores the metadata about the ACK frames regardless.
In and of itself that's ok, but if a malicious peer establishes a connection, and
then drives the connection such that ACK-only packets are forced from the
OpenSSL implementation peer (i.e., by sending numerous PING frames),
and then withholding any subsequent acks for ack-eliciting data, like
legitimate data, said malicious peer can force inappropriate memory growth
on the OpenSSL peer, potentially leading to a Denial of Service.
The fix is to ensure that we account for the transmission of the ACK-only
packet in the packet histories high and low watermark without actually storing
the ACK-only packet metadata itself.
FIPS impact: no
The OpenSSL FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC code is
outside the FIPS module boundary.